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Introduction
In most industrialized countries Public Employment Agencies (hereafter, PEA) provide job-broking services -help job seekers to obtain jobs and employers to fill vacancies, enforce search requirements attached to unemployment benefit receipt and train unemployed workers to improve their employability. While the latter two responsibilities have received much attention in the economics literature, 2 Using a theoretical model, we obtain novel implications regarding the application/search behaviors of workers and market outcomes, e.g.
the wage and the factors influencing the decision to use a certain search channel. These and other implications are tested empirically. The results strongly support our theory.
Our approach takes seriously the role of the PEA to serve as a coordination mechanism in the job seekers' application process. The PEA does much more than just providing an additional platform or market place. The staff at the PEA observes and guides the application behavior of unemployed job seekers and directs it towards vacancies. 3 It whereby helps to spread applications more evenly among all registered vacancies as shown by Holzner and Watanabe (2017) . This process requires the centralization and coordination that only intermediaries are able to pursue. Whatever new technologies firms develop and whatever efforts they make for strengthening their own recruiting team, individual firms are not able to coordinate the application behavior of job seekers. The same is true for workers.
In theory part, we investigate the implication of having a PEA in the labor market, which provides a market place with less (or no) coordination frictions. We do so by constructing a simple equilibrium model where firms decide whether they register their vacancy with the PEA or search in the private (or decentralized) market under coordination frictions. 4 In our setup, all unemployed are registered at the PEA. For them, searching in the decentralized market is costly. We show that the PEA and the private 1 Early studies on the effects of unemployment benefits and unemployment duration are Narendaranathan et al.
market can coexist. The intermediation services provided by the PEA reduce wage competition and enable firms to pay lower wages compared to the decentralized market. In contrast, the decentralized mechanism of a directed search market requires that vacancies offer a higher wage to attract workers.
Given these different allocation mechanisms, job seekers are not willing to engage in costly search for a better-paid job unless the prospect to be successful is good enough. This gives rise to positive self-selection of workers into the private market. The trade-off between lower coordination frictions and lower wages in the PEA on the one side with a negative selection of workers on the other side explains why not all vacancies (within one job category) are registered with the PEA.
We empirically test of our theory. Using vacancy data from Germany, we show -using within vacancy variation -that the fraction of suitable applicants coming via the PEA is about 5.7 to 12.5 percent lower than the fraction of suitable applicants coming via the private market. 5 This result is very robust, since our data set allows us to control for vacancy fixed effects. We also investigate whether firms registered with the PEA are offering lower wages by looking at three pieces of information. First, using the German Job Vacancy Survey we find a PEA wage gap between unregistered and registered firms of 2.9 to 5.4 percentage points. Second, firms registered with the PEA are more likely to report difficulties in the recruitment process, because their applicants demanded higher wages. This not only supports the direct evidence that registered vacancies offer lower wages than unregistered vacancies, but also implies that one and the same worker can receive multiple offers, which differ systematically depending on whether the vacancy is registered with the PEA or not. The wage difference and the difference in the higher fraction of refused job offers because applicants demanded higher wages persist after controlling for many observable worker-, firm-, and job-characteristics. Most importantly our control variables allow us to rule out alternative explanations for the observed PEA wage gap. By controlling for firm size as well as indicator variables concerning "low sales", "financial constraints", and "skilled labor shortage" we are able to control -along these dimensions -for a selection of less productive firms into registering with the PEA. By controlling for worker characteristics like age, gender, experience, and most importantly the previous employment status, we are able to control for a selection of less productive workers into unemployment and for the enforcement policy of the PEA, which requires unemployed workers to accept jobs with lower wage offers. Our third piece of evidence is based on individual level data. Here we can control for worker fixed effects and find a PEA wage gap of 3.0 percentage points, if the PEA was actively involved in forming the match.
Our theoretical analysis suggests that the implicit cost associated with the less suited pool of applicants coming via the PEA explains why not all vacancies register with the PEA. We test this hypothesis by looking at the variation in PEA registration rates across occupations. 6 In our theory 5 This evidence is complementary to the evidence provided in the existing literature, which shows that less suited workers are more likely to use the PEA. Our complement is important to understand the role of the PEA in the labor market, since the evidence from the workers' side alone does not necessarily imply that registered vacancies receive on average a less suited pool of applicants. It could have been that the PEA has an informational advantage and sorts out less suited workers and thereby helps registered firms to overcome information asymmetries. Instead, our empirical result suggests that this is not the case. 6 In the German Job Vacancy Survey (2005 to 2008) we find that the PEA registration rates of vacancies for corporate managers (20.5%), business (29.4%) and legal (33.8%) professionals, or medical doctors (30.2%), are far below average (48.3%) while the PEA registration rates of gardeners (68.2%), bricklayers (75.4%), electricians (62.2%), painters we use two measures to characterize the suitability of a pool of applicants. The first one is the overall fraction of certainly productive workers, i.e., the share of job seekers, who are always suitable. The second one is the probability that an uncertain worker is suitable. Following our theory we use the observed fractions of suitable applicants coming via the private market and via the PEA respectively to obtain occupation specific values for these two theoretical measures and use them to explain the use of the PEA as search channel. Our empirical analysis shows that these two measures are, as suggested by our theory, highly positively correlated with the use of the PEA as search channel. They explain together 18.3% in the overall variation in occupation specific PEA registration rates. 7 This strongly supports our theoretical explanation for which factors determine the use of the PEA as search channel.
Our theory also predicts that vacancies associated with high job creation costs or high interview costs are less likely to be registered with the PEA. The intuition is that the high flexibility of wages and matching probabilities in the private market ensures that firms are able to pass on part of these costs to workers. This is not possible in the PEA, since wages stay at workers' reservation wages and the allocation technology remains constant. One might expect that jobs requiring a high qualification or permanent jobs are associated with high interview and/or job creation costs in comparison with job requiring a low qualification or temporary jobs. In this way, our theory can also explain why we find empirically that jobs requiring a high qualification or permanent jobs are less likely to be registered with the PEA.
While our data is only available for the period after the Hartz reforms, our results help to un- increased matching efficiency at the PEA is associated with lower wages on average, i.e., does not lead to higher wages as the structural matching models used in this literature suggest.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. This introductory section closes with the literature survey. Section 2 describes how the PEA works in Germany. Section 3 presents the theoretical model of the labor market in the presence of the PEA. Section 4 investigates the empirical implications of the theory. Section 5 concludes. All proofs and some omitted tables are collected in the Appendix.
Related Literature
The existing literature studies the use of the PEA and the effects of using the PEA only from the job seekers' perspective. It shows that unemployment benefit recipients, low skilled workers, long-term unemployed and workers with few job opportunities are more likely to use a PEA. 8 The empirical evidence for the effect on wages is mixed. Holzer (1988) lower than the wages paid by unregistered vacancies. If worker-, firm-, and job-characteristics are not sufficient to account for the gap, then our analysis suggests, that the coordination mechanism in the PEA could be responsible for why studies using individual level data (like our study as well) obtain a wage gap even after controlling for observable characteristics.
The pioneering theoretical work of the PEA is developed by Pissarides (1979) . We adopt the baseline setups in accordance with his model as much as possible. Like him we assume that all unemployed are registered at the PEA, that searching in the decentralized market is costly for workers, and that firms can choose between two alternative methods of finding a worker: the search market and the PEA. There are two major differences between his and our model. First, workers are homogeneous in Pissarides (1979) , while the key ingredient of our model is that workers differ in expected suitability for the job. Second, Pissarides (1979) considers a random search model and assumes an exogenous and identical wage in both markets. In contrast, we show that firms in the decentralized market choose to post higher wages than firms registered with the PEA using a directed search model. 9 Since the value of searching in the private market is higher for workers with a high expected suitability, the endogenous wage differential allows firms in the private market to attract a better pool of applicants.
In an extension, Pissarides (1979) considers the limiting case where search frictions are eliminated in the PEA. He finds that in this case the private market collapses and all workers search via the PEA. This is in contrast to our model. We show that the positive selection of workers in the search market ensures the existence of the decentralized search market even if the PEA manages to match the short side of the market.
Our model is also related to the literature of intermediation. Watanabe (2010 Watanabe ( , 2013 provide a model of middlemen (e.g., retailers, wholesalers, trading entrepreneurs, dealers or brokers of services and durable goods and assets), 10 where he demonstrates that backed by the capability of dealing with many agents at a time, middlemen find it optimal to provide customers with proximity or a lower likelihood of experiencing stockout, and to charge a higher price. That the PEA in the present framework provides a coordinated transaction is similar to his middlemen's capability of pursuing 9 In the directed search literature, where workers simultaneously apply for multiple jobs, Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006) show that firms engage in Bertrand competition, if their applicant receives two or more offers. Unlike in their setup, we assume wage commitment and show that a low wage can survive in equilibrium due to the coordinated allocation mechanism used by the PEA. Galenianos and Kircher (2009) consider the case of commitment with homogeneous workers and show the existence of an equilibrium wage dispersion. In our model, there are some workers, who use both the search market and the PEA and hence receive multiple offers -one from the search market and the other from the PEA. In this setup we show that, while the search market has a unique wage, a wage differential exists between the search market and the PEA. Our modeling choice reflects the institutional difference between the two market places in reality. 10 The seminal work in the literature of middlemen is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987 
The Public Employment Agency
To motivate the setup of the PEA in our theoretical analysis we start with describing how the PEA works. In 2015 the PEA in Germany had an overall budget of 31.5 Billion Euros. Around one fourth of the total budget, i.e., 7.93 Billion Euros, was spent on administration including the wage costs for the roughly 90,000 workers employed at the PEA. The German government therefore spends around 0.3% of German GDP on the administration cost of the PEA. A significant fraction of employees deal with the administration of unemployment benefits. Still, more than half of the PEA's employees work in the intermediation to help workers and vacancies to find a good match. In this section we explain, what kind of intermediation services are provided by the PEA (compare Figure 1) .
The PEA provides an online search platform (https://jobboerse.arbeitsagentur.de), where job seekers can upload their curriculum vitae, post job wanted adds, and search actively for vacancies 11 Casella and Hanaki (2008) and Galenianos (2013) study firms' use of referrals by their own employees in addition to formal hiring channels. Referred workers may be more suited for the job, because referred workers carry a more accurate productivity signal than workers contacted through a formal search channel. The search channels in our model do not differ in their signaling ability. They differ in the allocation mechanism used. In the search market firms can increase the probability to meet a worker by offering a higher wage, while firms' meeting probability at the PEA is independent of the wages they offer. The novelty of our paper is to show that the higher degree of wage competition among firms in the search market compared to the PEA leads to a positive selection of applicants. Services provided by the PEA Figure 1 : Services provided by the PEA If a worker becomes unemployed, she registers with the PEA and is assigned to a case manager.
The case manager will interview the person. A worker, who has some deficits, will be offered training.
The majority of unemployed do not get training, they are only taught how to use the platform.
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The case manager will propose certain jobs to the worker. With their experience case managers can encourage search, broaden the view of applicants, and suggest jobs, which workers would not have considered on their own.
On top of coaching unemployed workers, the PEA offers recruiting assistance to vacancies. Firms which post a vacancy on the platform can decide whether to make the vacancy available for recommendations by case managers. They can also ask their contact person at the PEA to propose workers.
The contact person is asked to recommend at least one worker within 48 hour. In case the vacancy asks for recruiting assistance the contact person can view the platform account of the specific vacancy and manage the number of recommendations made by case managers accordingly.
To summarize, the platform offered by the PEA reduces search costs for job seekers and vacancies.
More importantly, its intermediation services reduce coordination frictions, i.e., the friction that some vacancies might receive many applications while others receive none. The fact that the staff at the PEA can guide the application behavior of their unemployed job seekers and direct it towards vacancies helps to spread applications more evenly among all registered vacancies. We will therefore assume in the theory part that the PEA reduces coordination frictions for registered firms. This assumption is also empirically backed by the findings of Holzner and Watanabe (2017) , who show that the PEA distributes applicants more evenly compared to the private market.
Theoretical Analysis
In this theory section we analyze the implications of having a PEA in the labor market, which provides a market place with less (or no) coordination frictions in the job application stage. We do so by building a simple equilibrium model where firms decide whether they register their vacancy with the PEA or search in the private market with coordination frictions. We first present the baseline model and show under which conditions firms register their vacancy with the PEA. This explains the variation in PEA registration within the same job category. Our theory also offers predictions about wages and the fraction of suitable applicants, which we will test empirically in section 4. We then analyze how the fraction of registered vacancies varies across occupations.
Setup
We consider an economy with a mass of unemployed workers and firms. We denote by v ∈ (0, ∞) the population ratio of firms to unemployed workers. Each firm has one job vacancy that needs to be filled, and each worker wishes to find a job. The matching process is shaped by coordination and information frictions.
There are two types of workers. A fraction m of them is certain that they fulfill the qualification requirement. They will always produce an output, normalized to unity, at any job, which requires this level of qualification. The remaining workers are uncertain of whether they fulfill the qualification requirement. They are only productive with probability δ ∈ (0, 1). So, with probability 1 − δ, a match between an uncertain worker and a firm produces 0. If an uncertain worker fulfills the qualification requirement, he is as productive as a certain worker. Thus, all certain workers and the fraction δ of uncertain workers are referred to as suitable or productive workers. While the information about whether or not a worker is productive for a job is revealed at the stage of the job interview, the worker's type (certain or uncertain) is private knowledge. The two dimensions m -the overall fraction of certainly productive workers -and δ -the probability that an uncertain worker is productivedetermine average productivity and information frictions and allow us to combine uncertainty about match quality with private information about the qualification level on the workers' side.
There are two markets (or two channels) through which matching between firms and unemployed workers can occur (see Figure 2 ). One market is provided by the Public Employment Agency (PEA), where all unemployed workers are registered in order to collect unemployment benefit (normalized to zero). We model the job-brokering service provided by the PEA as follows. All job applications sent by unemployed workers to vacancies registered with the PEA are coordinated so that workers and firms are brought together on a one by one basis. We denote by a ∈ (0, 1] the maximum number of matching pairs the PEA can propose. a is a technological parameter. The other channel is a search market, which may be referred to as a decentralized or private market. Here, unlike in the PEA, search is costly for workers and workers are unable to coordinate their applications. Workers have to incur an individual specific search cost represented by c drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. The parameter c is uncorrelated with the worker's ex ante type. 13 How workers search without coordination will be specified below. In what follows, we construct a labor market equilibrium which has the following characteristics.
A fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1) of firms registered with the PEA post a wage w a = 0 and a fraction 1 − ρ of firms in the search market post a wage w ∈ (0, 1). All workers are registered in the PEA and accept the 13 Our main result will go through even if we allow for such a correlation (see Appendix A.10).
14 This modeling choice follows from the seminal work by Pissarides (1979) . One could allow firms to operate both the PEA and the search market simultaneously with some costs, but such an extension would complicate the analysis significantly without delivering any additional insights. Gautier and Holzner (2016) consider the wage formation within such a worker-firm network.
wage w a = 0 if it is the only offer they have received. A certain (uncertain) worker enters a search market if and only if his search cost c is no greater than a reservation value c c (c u ) (see Figure 3) , and is hired with probability η (δη) in the search market (yet to be derived endogenously). Each individual firm in the directed search market is characterized by an effective queue of applicants,
which measures the expected queue of productive applicants for the job. The numerator equals the total number of productive workers in the search market -mc c certain and
types -, while the denominator equals the total number of vacancies in the search market. Each firm employs a productive worker (and can produce an output of 1) with probabilityxη in the search market and with probability min{1,
min{1, a/ (vρ)} is the probability of a registered firm to be assigned an unemployed worker by the
) the probability that the assigned worker is productive and available, i.e., does not receive a better-paid offer in the private market. In the following we show that workers and firms have no incentive to deviate from the proposed search market equilibrium.
Labor Market Equilibrium and Within Job Variation in PEA Registration
In this section, we fix the set of parameters m, δ, which vary across occupations, and derive the firms'
PEA registration behavior within a given type of job. For now, we make the following assumptions:
(a) the information about whether or not an applicant is productive for a job is revealed with no costs at the stage of the job interview; (b) the number of vacancies is exogenously given and the firms' cost required to post a vacancy is normalized to zero for both markets; (c) the PEA is not able to distinguish the ex-ante type of workers. Assumptions (a) to (c) will be relaxed in section 3.3.
Workers' Search Decision Assuming for the moment the existence of an equilibrium, we first describe workers' search decision. Denote by U c (U u ) the equilibrium value of searching in the private market for a worker with certain (uncertain) type. Since a worker with certain (uncertain) type and search cost c searches if and only if c ≤ U c (c ≤ U u ), we can describe the participation decision by a reservation value for the search cost, i.e.,
respectively. Given that search costs are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] , the threshold values c c and c u determine the fraction of certain and uncertain workers that choose to search in the private market. Figure 3 illustrates the search population of certain and uncertain types of workers.
Given the participation decision, we now describe workers' application decision in the search market. Each worker observes the wages posted by firms in the private market and forms expectations about the average effective queue of productive workers applying to each vacancy. In order to be able to calculate the expected utility from applying at a particular firm, we first need to compute the probability that a productive applicant gets employed by a firm, η.
Lemma 1
The employment probability of productive applicants is homogeneous of degree one, and can be written as a function of the effective queuex ∈ (0, ∞) given by (1), i.e., η = η(x). Further, it satisfies the standard properties of matching functions (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) : η(x) (xη(x)) is strictly concave and decreasing (increasing) inx.
Suppose a worker observes a firm in the search market with a wage offer w > 0 and an associated effective queuex . Given the employment probability function η(x), the worker calculates the value of applying to such a firm. In any equilibrium, where U c is the expected value of search for certain workers offered by the private market, a certain worker will apply to such a firm, if the effective queuẽ
because certain workers will be suitable to any firm. Similarly, for uncertain workers it is,
since the employment probability for an uncertain worker is given by δη(x ). In equilibrium equations (2) and (3) will hold with equality, since firms are not willing to offer workers more than the market utility U c and U u . In equilibrium we therefore have δU c = U u and δc c = c u . Equation (2), which ensures that workers will apply, determines the effective queue of productive workersx =x (w |U c )
as a strictly increasing function of the wage w given the market value U c (and U u ).
Firms' Wage Offers Given the search behavior of workers described above, the next step is to characterize equilibrium wages. Given the wage offer w a = 0 by firms registered with the PEA (which will be verified shortly), we first derive an equilibrium wage in the search market. In any equilibrium where U c (U u ) is the market value of a certain (uncertain) worker, the optimal wage of a firm, denoted
Note here that, givenx =x (w |U c ), the firm takes into account that the higher the offered wage w , the larger the effective queue of productive workersx and the higher the probability of hiring successfully a suitable (productive) worker. Hence, the standard first order condition implies that firms in the private market will offer a wage w = w(U c ) > 0 in equilibrium.
Given the wage offer w > 0 in the search market, we show next that the equilibrium wage offer in the PEA must satisfy w a = 0. Given that a proportion ρ ∈ [0, 1) of firms are in the PEA, the wage w a = 0 in the PEA yields an equilibrium profit,
where, given the probability of being allocated a worker min{a/ (vρ) , 1}, the term m(1 − c c η(x)) (or
represents the expected number of certain (or uncertain) workers, who do not receive a job offer in search markets and are willing to accept w a = 0.
The PEA matches registered workers and firms using its job-brokering mechanism. This allocation is independent of the wages offered by registered firms. The fact that registered firms cannot increase the PEA-internal matching probability min{a/ (vρ) , 1} by offering a higher wage implies that registered firms will never compete among themselves. They will only compete with firms in the private market. This is the reason why a wage offer w a ∈ (0, w) cannot be profitable, since such a deviation implies a mere increase in the wage cost without improving the probability of hiring a suitable worker.
If a deviating firm posts w a ≥ w, then it can hire an assigned productive worker (if any), irrespective of whether the worker gets another offer in search markets. However, the associated increase in expected productivity is not high enough to be able to compensate for the higher wage cost. This guarantees -together with the absence of PEA-internal wage competition due to the job-brokering mechanismthat w a = 0 is the unique equilibrium wage in the PEA.
Lemma 2 For any ρ ∈ (0, 1), the equilibrium wage is higher in the search market than in the PEA, w > w a .
Firms' Market Choice In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter the PEA or the search market for hiring a worker. Firms will choose the market that offers the highest expected profit.
Thereby, the equilibrium condition is given by,
where the equilibrium effective queue length in the search marketx =x(ρ) is given in equation (1) for ρ ∈ [0, 1), and the equilibrium profits Π s (x) and Π a (x) are given by equation (4) and with an inactive PEA for v ≤ v * . This equilibrium is unique.
Our theory establishes that despite the high wage costs and coordination frictions in the application stage, some or all firms find it profitable to use the decentralized search market, instead of the PEA.
This has two reasons. First, the benefit of using the search market is to obtain a higher chance of receiving an application from a suitable (productive) worker. The second reason is due to the flexibility of the private market. Depending on the market tightness v and the selection of workers the probability of successfully hiring a productive worker can be very high in the private market, while it is fixed in the PEA given the assignment technology of applicants. Also the wage in the decentralized market is lower if the number of firms v is lower, so that the search market is less tight and less competitive. Hence, as shown in Proposition 1, an equilibrium with active search market always exists and is unique.
A dynamic version of your model leads to a reservation wage above unemployment benefits and would imply that the proportion of suitable (productive) workers in the pool of unemployed would endogenously be lower -due to adverse selection. But qualitatively our results remain unchanged.
The following three corollaries are immediate consequences of Proposition 1, but derive further implications of the above equilibrium. First, certain types have a better prospect of getting a job offer than uncertain types, because they are productive at any firm. Hence, the high wage offer in the private market induces a high participation rate of certain types, so that the private market can offer a better selection of workers than the PEA does (see Figure 4 ).
Corollary 1
The proportion of suitable applicants among all available applicants is higher in the search market than in the PEA, i.e.,
for any m ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (0, 1). Second, by comparing the above equilibrium with the one with no PEA (i.e., the search market is the only avenue of finding a worker/job) we can isolate the role of the PEA in our economy.
Corollary 2
The PEA creates job opportunities for those who are discouraged from searching in the private market. The respective share of unemployed is larger among uncertain types (the ones with a lower prospect of finding a job) than certain types.
The PEA creates this job opportunities for discouraged workers by attracting vacancies, which value the job-brokering services, since it allows them to offer lower wages, and by giving all unemployed workers an equal chance of having an interview. As stated above, this gives rise to the economic value of worker selection in the private market.
Finally, we can contrast our theory with Pissarides (1979) , where with homogeneous workers and exogenous wage the private market collapses and all workers search via the PEA, if search frictions in the PEA are eliminated.
Corollary 3
For the values of technological parameter large enough to make the PEA match the short side, i.e., a ≥ min{vρ, 1}, the search market will still be active in equilibrium.
In our framework with heterogeneous workers and endogenous wages, the higher probability of receiving a suitable (productive) applicant ensures the existence of an active decentralized market even if the PEA manages to match the short side of the market.
Across Job Variation in PEA Registration
Based on the framework established above, we explore the determinants of vacancies' PEA registration rates across different occupations (types of jobs). In the first part of this section we investigate the effect of changes in the overall fraction of certainly productive workers, m, and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, (as well as the matching technology of the PEA a). In the second part we change our assumptions (a)-(c) one at a time, and analyze how each of these extensions would change the active use of the PEA in comparison with our baseline model. By linking the extensions "interviewing costs", "vacancy creation costs", and "informational advantage of the PEA" to job characteristics we get further hypotheses on the determinants of vacancies' PEA registration rates across different types of jobs.
Comparative Statics
Proposition 2 The PEA is more likely to be active when the overall fraction of certainly productive workers, m, the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, or the matching technology of the PEA, a < ρv, is higher.
The intuition behind this result is that with a higher overall fraction of certainly productive workers, m, or a higher probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, the advantage of having a better chance of receiving productive applicants in the search market compared to the PEA is reduced. This increases the attractiveness of the PEA and makes it more likely that it is used. A higher matching efficiency in the PEA (as long as a < ρv) will make the PEA more attractive and increases the fraction of firms that register with the PEA.
The proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, is likely to vary across occupations. In section 4.4 below, we use our theory to obtain occupation specific values for m i and δ i from the occupation specific data on the fractions of suitable applicants among applicants coming via the PEA and via the private market and show that the positive correlations between m i and δ i and PEA registration hypothesized by our theory can be found in the data.
Extensions In the labor market equilibrium established in our baseline model, both labor market institutions can coexist. By extending the baseline model, we show that the PEA is likely to be active when (a) interview costs and (b) vacancy creation costs are low, and when (c) the PEA has an information advantage about workers' types compared to the private market.
To address the first extension, suppose that a job interview requires a fixed cost, denoted by f ≥ 0, and that the total interviewing cost of a firm is proportional to the number of applicants it receives.
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The number of applicants each firm receives (and interviews it makes) is at most one in the PEA while it is random in the search market. The total interview costs of firms are f in the PEA andxf /θ on average in the search market, where θ is the share of suitable (productive) applicants in the search market and sox/θ is the queue of workers (both productive and unproductive). With this extension, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 (Interviewing Costs): Suppose there is a cost of interviewing an applicant, f > 0.
Then, a search market equilibrium with an active PEA exists as long as f is not too high. For relatively high f , the PEA is inactive and only the search market exists.
The PEA is not attractive when interviewing costs are high, because registered firms have to cover the interview cost alone whereas in the private market the interview cost is partly passed on to unemployed workers via a lower wage. Thus, higher interview costs reduce profits of registered firms more than profits of unregistered firms.
In the next extension, suppose that vacancy creation requires costs denoted by K ∈ (0, 1) and that the number of vacancies is determined by a free entry condition,
where Π a = Π a (x) is given by (5) and Π s = Π s (x) by (11) . Whenever the search market exists, its effective queuex is determined by this free entry condition. A search market exists for any K ∈ (0, 1), since free entry ensures that the queue lengthx will adjust in such a way that profits in the search market are equal to vacancy creation costs. Note, that profits in the PEA cannot adjust as flexibly as in the private market, since wages and the allocation technology a remain constant. Consequently, firms cease to use the PEA even for vacancy creation costs that still ensure an active search market.
As the final extension we analyze what happens if the PEA knows more about unemployed workers than firms do. Suppose now that the PEA is able to observe the (ex ante) type of workers -certain or uncertain -, and distributes certain workers prior to uncertain workers. The information advantage may occur due to the frequent interactions between the registered unemployed and the case manager, backed by the accumulated knowledge from past experiences. Given such an ability of the PEA, if min{a, vρ} ≤ m,
then all applicants that the PEA distributes are productive workers. This yields an equilibrium profit of a firm,
where, given that an applicant is productive for sure, the term 1 − c c η(x) represents the probability that an applicant assigned to the firm has not received a job offer in the search market and is willing to accept w a = 0. As before, any deviation from w a = 0 is not profitable. Note, however, that if condition (6) does not hold, also uncertain workers will be distributed. This decreases the average productivity of those workers distributed by the PEA and increases the incentive of firms to use the private market.
Proposition 5 (Informational Advantage of the PEA): Suppose that the PEA can observe the (ex ante) type of workers, and distribute certain workers prior to uncertain workers. Then, the PEA will become more likely to be active relative to the baseline setup. Search markets will be inactive if and only if min{a, m} ≥ v.
The PEA can prevent workers and firms from using the private market if it is able to allocate a productive applicant to every registered vacancy. We should note, however, that even with such an ability, search markets become active when the population of certain types is scarce, i.e., m is small.
The fact that the vast majority of firms use the private market suggests either that the PEA has no informational advantage or that the fraction of certainly productive worker m is sufficiently small. In section 4.4 below, we show that the estimated occupation specific fractions of certainly productive workers m i are in the range between 0.1% and 47.6%.
To the extent that for high (low) qualification jobs the amount of information needed to identify the suitability of applicants is relatively high (low), the extended model with interview costs predicts that jobs, which require a high (low) qualification level and hence higher (lower) interview cost are less (more) likely to register with the PEA. The same is true, if we assume that jobs, which require less qualification, are less costly to create (relative to output, which we normalized to one), the model extension with endogenous vacancy creation then predicts -as before -that jobs with a lower qualification requirement are more likely to register with the PEA. In section 4.4 we present empirical evidence, which support these hypotheses.
Empirical Analysis
We will first introduce the data sets used in this paper. Then, we will investigate whether we can find in the data the forces, which explain theoretically that only a fraction of firms register their vacancies with the PEA, i.e., that the share of suitable applicants is lower among applicants coming from the PEA compared to the private market and that wages paid by registered jobs are lower. In the second part we will test whether occupations with an higher overall fraction of certainly productive workers and with a higher probability that the uncertain workers are suitable have a higher PEA registration rate. We will also test whether temporary job or jobs, which require a low qualification level, are more likely to register with the PEA.
Data
For our analysis we use two data-sets. The German Job Vacancy Survey to gain information about how the PEA influences firms' job search process and the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP)
to gain information on how the PEA influences workers' job search behavior.
German Job Vacancy Survey
The German Job Vacancy Survey is collected by the Institute for Employment Research in German.
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It is based on a representative sample of establishments, which is newly sampled each year. The yearly survey started in 1989 and was initially conducted to provide an estimate of the total number of vacancies in Germany relative to the number of vacancies registered with the PEA.
The survey includes establishment level data on the number of employees, number of vacancies, hires and quits in the last 12 months, and information on the industry and region of the firm. The economic conditions of a firm can be proxied by binary indicator variables for "low sales", "financial constraints", and "skilled labor shortage". It also contains a number of questions concerning the last case of a successfully filled vacancy. In this part of the survey firms were asked which search channels they used and through which channel they hired. Since we are interested in the implications of searching in a private market versus the PEA, we exclude those vacancies, where the hiring firm exclusively used a recruitment channel like the internal job market, recommendations by employees, and the selection from former apprentices or interns. The survey also provides information on the number of applicants, the number of suitable applicants, the qualification and experience level required for the job, information on job characteristics like occupation, permanent/temporary, full-/part-time, and weekend-work required. The data also contains information on whether a firm experienced difficulties in the recruitment process due to "high wage demands" of applicants, which we use as one piece of evidence to investigate the existence of a wage difference between registered and unregistered vacancies. Data on wages paid to newly hired workers is only available for the year 2014. We also have some information on the newly hired worker like the age, gender, and the previous employment status. 16 The data used in this article were made available to us by In our analysis we use the full sample and a subsample, which only includes vacancies that were successful in filling their vacancy before the intended starting data of the employment contract. The subsample is referred to as the restricted sample. We prefer this subsample, since it excludes cases in which a firm might rethink its search strategy after having failed to find a worker within the expected time. We want to exclude such cases in order to rule out reverse causality.
German Socio Economic Panel
To complement the picture from the job seekers perspective, we use data from the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP). The GSOEP is a longitudinal survey of German households, which started in 1984 and is conducted on the annual basis ever since. 18 The GSOEP is the largest and most comprehensive household panel in Germany, which compared to the administrative data provided by the Federal Employment Agency includes not only the job search information of workers registered with the PEA but also of other non-employed job seekers.
For our analysis we first use the information on the search behavior of non-employed individuals and the wages earned in their subsequent job. For the years 2005 to 2007 non-employed in the GSOEP were asked whether they search actively for a job in the last four weeks. From this group of workers we selected all non-employed workers below the age of 60, who send at least one application. 19 For them we have the information on the search channels they used (PEA, job ads, internet, network, speculative application) and a host of personal characteristics including whether they are registered as unemployed with the PEA. For non-employed worker, who found a job within the next year, we therefore know the search and hiring channel through which they obtained the job and the hourly gross wage of the job. Since there are only 423 observations for this group of non-employed job seekers, who found a job in the subsequent year, we cannot control for worker-fixed effect. To control for worker-fixed effects we alternatively use the larger sample of employed workers from 2003 to 2013, for whom we only know whether the PEA was used as hiring channel.
17 A firm will only label a worker as being "sent by the PEA", if it got notice that the PEA was involved. This is clearly the case, if the vacancy asked for recruiting assistance and was recommended the applicants by its contact person. The firm could also learn it from the applicant. In Germany, it is common practice that one states in the first sentence of the application letter, where one learned about the open position. If the vacancy is registered with the PEA, the firm signals that it is willing to employ unemployed workers. There is therefore no incentive for job seekers to conceal that they learned about the open position through the PEA. In this case the worker could have found the vacancy via the online-platform of the PEA, or her case manager recommended the vacancy to her. For data security reasons the dataset cannot be linked to the information on the online platform. So we cannot observe which kind of intermediation service provided by the PEA were used during the recruitment process. 18 The data used in this article were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin. 19 We exclude workers above the age of 60, since they can receive unemployment benefits without actively searching for a job.
Differences in the Fraction of Suitable Applicants
The main insight of our theory is the positive self-selection of workers into the private market (Corollary 1).
Hypothesis 1:
The fraction of suitable applicants is higher among applicants from the private market than among applicants sent by the PEA.
In Table 1 The difference in the fraction of suitable applicants is statistically significant for most subgroups of vacancies. The lack of significance for some subgroups is likely to be driven by the low number of observations in these subgroups.
To be able to control for vacancy-fixed effects, we included in the sample in Table B.2 above only vacancies, which registered their vacancies with the PEA and for which we have data on the fraction of suitable applicants from both the PEA and the private market. In order to check the external validity of our results, we present in Table ? ? in the Appendix results of OLS regressions for all registered and not registered vacancies. The coefficient for the indicator variable for using the PEA as search channel shows that using the PEA is associated with a 4.2 to 4.6 percentage points increase in the overall fraction of suitable applicants. This confirms our previous findings.
Given the observation that the fraction of suitable applicants sent by the PEA is lower than the respective fraction of suitable workers, who applied through the private market, and the evidence by the empirical literature using individual-level data, 20 we believe that the pool of workers at the PEA (i.e., registered unemployed) is indeed a negative selection of the average applicant. Our analysis is the first to provide evidence for this negative self-selection from the firms' perspective. This is important, because it suggests that the PEA either has no informational advantage or -that in case it has an informational advantage -it does not want to use it in its matching procedure. 21 
Wage differences
In this subsection we investigate from the vacancy's and the worker's perspective how the presence of the PEA influences wage payments. We start our investigation by looking at the information available in the German Job Vacancy Survey.
Wages paid by registered compared to unregistered vacancies
Hypothesis 2: Wages posted and paid by firms registered with the PEA are lower than wages posted and paid by firms only active in the private market.
To investigate this hypothesis we first use the German Job Vacancy Survey in 2014, which -for the first time -collected the information on the wages paid to workers hired for the vacancy. A first look at the descriptive statistics is affirmative. A worker hired for a job, which was registered with the PEA, is on average paid 12.84 Euros per hour. This is 2.34 Euro less than the 15.18 Euros per hour, which workers earn at jobs offered purely in the private market.
The descriptive difference could be driven by the heterogeneity between registered and unregistered vacancies. In the OLS-regressions in Table 2 we control for the worker-, firm-, and vacancy characteristics. The German Job Vacancy Survey provides information on the age, the gender and the previous employment status of the hired worker. The information on age and the job's qualification requirement allows us to calculate the potential labor market experience of the hired worker.
To do so we use job qualification requirements to approximate the years of schooling. Variables that control for vacancy characteristics include the required qualification and experience level, whether it is a permanent or temporary and full-time or part-time job. We also include an indicator variable, which captures whether the vacancy was registered with the PEA or not (PEA search channel). On the firm level we include the number of employees (log), an indicator variable if the firm is unionized, and the binary indicator variables "low sales", "financial constraints", and "skilled labor shortage" to control for the economic condition of the firm. We also control for region-, occupation-, and industry-fixed Our control variables allow us to rule out alternative explanations for the observed PEA wage gap.
By controlling for firm size as well as indicator variables concerning "low sales", "financial constraints", and "skilled labor shortage" we are able to control for a possible selection of less productive firms into registering with the PEA. Controlling for worker characteristics like age, gender, experience, and most importantly the previous employment status, implies that the remaining wage difference is not driven by a negative selection of workers into unemployment or by the enforcement (sanction) policy of the PEA, which requires unemployed workers to accept jobs with lower wage offers. The PEA wage gap can also be found for different submarkets as shown in Table B .3 in the Appendix, which shows the results for different types of vacancies. The lack of significance for some groups is likely to be driven by the low number of observations in these subgroups. (1) and (2) the OLS-regression results on (log) wages for the full sample and in columns (3) and (4) for the restricted sample. In the latter we exclude all those observations where firms agreed on an applicant after the intended starting date of the employment contract. The restricted sample should therefore rule out reverse causality, i.e., that firms, which were not successful in filling the vacancy before the intended starting date of the employment contract, adjusted their wage offer and search strategy by registering the vacancy with the PEA. We therefore regard the results in columns (3) and (4) as being more reliable.
Comparing columns (3) with column (4) shows that the effect is robust to including an indicator variable for cases where the worker is hired through the PEA. The fact that the coefficient on the "PEA hiring channel" indicator variable is statistically significant suggests that wages offered by firms do to some degree also depend on whether the worker was hired through the PEA or not.
Differences in experiencing difficulties due to "high wage demands"
The German Job Vacancy Survey also contains information on whether a firm had difficulties in filling the vacancy because its applicants demanded higher wages. This information can shed light not only into the question on whether registered vacancies offer lower wages than unregistered vacancies, it also provides information on whether a worker receives different wage offers from registered compared to unregistered vacancies.
Given the evidence presented above that registered vacancies pay lower wages, we expect that they are also more likely to experience difficulties in the hiring process due to higher wage demands by applicants. Registered vacancies experience such difficulties in 7.8% of all cases, while unregistered vacancies experience such difficulties only in 3.5% of all cases.
In Table 3 we use the same job-and firm-characteristics as control variables as in Table 2 . We do not include individual characteristics of the hired worker, since the question underlying the indicator variable "difficulties due to high wage demands" explicitly addresses the experience with all applicants.
The results in Table 3 indicate a strong positive correlation between registering a vacancy with the PEA and experiencing difficulties in the recruitment process due to high wage demands by applicants.
Thus, having registered the vacancy with the PEA (and posted a respective wage) is associated with an increase in the probability to experience difficulties due to higher wage demands by 3.8 to 4.1 percentage points. The effect is virtually the same if we exclude all observations where firms agreed on an applicant after the intended starting date of the employment contract (restricted sample in columns (3) and (4)). Whether a firm hired the worker through the PEA has no influence on the probability to experience difficulties in the recruitment process due to higher wage demands. The same pattern holds if we divide the sample into different subgroups as shown in Table B .4 in the Appendix.
Wages earned by workers using the PEA as search and hiring channel In this section we use the GSOEP to investigate the question from the worker's perspective. According to our theory workers are offered lower wages by firms registered with the PEA compared to wages offered by unregistered firms. If workers receive multiple offers, they will accept the higher offer. Thus, the earned wage will depend on the search channel through which the worker was hired, i.e., on the hiring channel. Whether the PEA was used as search channel should not matter. Table 4 in order to provide some evidence on how the PEA search channel in interaction with the PEA hiring channel is correlated with the hourly gross wage. In columns (2) and (3) we present results using data from 2003 to 2013.
Here we only know whether the PEA was used as hiring channel, but we have no information on the search channels used. We include again only regular full-time and part-time jobs. Column (3) shows our preferred wage regression with individual fixed effects. In column (2) we include OLS estimates for the same sample in order to get an idea about the likely bias caused by not using individual fixed effects. In Table 4 we present a standard Mincer wage regression with work and unemployment experience, work and unemployment experience squared, and educational indicator variables according to the ISCED 1997 classification. We also include an indicator variables for being registered as unemployed in the previous year, for a permanent job, and for six firm size groups, as well as year and occupation fixed effects (ISCO classification).
The result in column (1) in Table 4 supports our hypothesis that using the PEA as hiring channel leads to a lower hourly gross wage while using the PEA as search channel has no influence. However, due to the small sample size of 423 observations for employed workers we cannot control for individual fixed effects. We are therefore cautious and do not interpret the size of the coefficients. To get a more reliable estimate for the effect that a direct involvement of the PEA has on the gross hourly wage, we present in column (3) of Table 4 a fixed-effects regression. The coefficient for the PEA hiring channel indicator variable suggests that the direct involvement of the PEA goes along with a wage difference of 3.0 percentage points. This difference is in line with the 3.2 to 4.2 percentage points wage difference found between registered and unregistered vacancies in Table 2 . The evidence provided in Table 4 therefore supports our theoretical model.
PEA registration across occupations
The proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, are according to our theory driving forces for use of the PEA as search channel. We can use our theory to obtain the following formulas, which link m and δ to the fractions of suitable applicants among applicants coming via the PEA, f P EA , and via the search market, f SM , i.e.,
Using these formulas we calculate occupation specific values for m and delta from the occupation specific fractions of suitable applicants f P EA and f SM .
In order to be able to compare occupation specific fractions of suitable applicants across occupations, we need to hold the set of job and firm characteristics constant. We do this by first regressing observable job and firm characteristics on the fraction of suitable applicants at the vacancy level (separately for applicants coming via the PEA and via the private market). 22 In the second step, we set the observable job and firm characteristics equal to the sample average and predict the occupation specific fractions of suitable applicants using the regression results. Given the estimates for the occupation specific fractions of suitable applicants f P EA and f SM we calculate the respective occupation specific values for the proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ using the formulas in (8). 22 The sample for the OLS regression explaining the fraction of suitable applicants coming via the PEA contains all registered vacancies with the respective information on the number of (suitable) applicants in the restricted sample. The sample for the OLS regression explaining the fraction of suitable applicants coming via the private market contains all non-registered vacancies in the restricted sample.
On average around 9.1% of all job seekers are estimated to be certainly productive (m is on average 9.1%). The estimates for m range from 0.1% to 47.6%. The estimates for δ range from 0.0% to 58.1%.
On average an uncertain worker is estimated to be productive in 22.2% of all cases. The occupation specific values for m and delta are positively correlated with the occupation specific PEA registration rate with a pairwise correlation coefficient of 33.6% and 34.5% as Proposition 2 predicts. The measures m and delta are almost uncorrelated as the pairwise correlation coefficient of 1.6% shows.
Column (1) and (2) of Table 5 presents OLS regressions on the occupation-level explaining the occupation specific PEA registration rates. In the first two rows we present the our estimates for the occupation specific proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the occupation specific probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ. They show that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of certainly productive workers increases the occupation specific PEA registration rate by 0.74 percentage points, and a one percentage point increase in the probability that an uncertain worker is productive increases the occupation specific PEA registration rate by 0.44 percentage points.
These are sizable effects. Comparing column (1) with column (2), where we omitted m and delta,
shows that adding the occupation specific proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the occupation specific probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, increases the R from 15.5% to 33.8%. Thus, m and delta are able to explain 18.3% of the total variation in PEA registration rates across occupations. All other job and firm characteristics are on the occupation level far less important.
Column (3) of Table 5 presents marginal effects for probit regressions explaining the use of the PEA as search channel on the vacancy level. The proportion of certainly productive workers, m, and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive, δ, have again sizable effects. A one percentage point increase in the proportion of certainly productive workers increases the probability that a vacancy uses the PEA as search channel by 0.41 percentage points and one percentage point increase in the probability that an uncertain worker is productive by 0.31 percentage points.
Column (3) of Table 5 also shows which other vacancy characteristics are associated with using the PEA as search channel. Jobs, which require a high qualification level are less likely to be registered with the PEA than job requiring a medium or low qualification level. This is well in line with the hypotheses derived in section 3.3. If jobs, which require a high qualification level are associated with higher job creation costs and/or interview costs, then this supports our hypothesis that high job creation and/or interview costs make it less likely that a vacancy is registered with the PEA.
Conclusion
We investigate the implications for the labor market of having the Public Employment Agency (PEA)
as additional market place with lower coordination frictions. This is an unexplored issue in the labor economics literature. We develop a new theoretical model, where firms can decide whether to search via the PEA or the private market, and show that lower coordination frictions in the PEA reduce wage competition and enable registered firms to pay lower wages compared to the private market. This advantage has to be traded off against the negative selection of applicants coming through the PEA compared to the private market. Further, our theory explains why the PEA is likely to be used by simple jobs that require only a lower level of qualification. We take these (and other) theoretical predictions to the data and find strong support for them. Analyzing the example of the PEA shows that firms are willing to hazard the consequences of coordination frictions in turn for a better chance of receiving a productive applicant. Our analysis also shows that occupation specific information measures on the proportion of certainly productive workers and the probability that an uncertain worker is productive are important determinants of the occupation specific PEA registration rates.
An interesting topic for future research would be to assess the effect of labor market reforms, Given the search behaviors of workers, each individual firm in the directed search market is characterized by a queue of applicants, denoted by x. The number of applicants n = 1, 2, 3, ... each individual firm receives is a random variable and follows from a Poisson distribution with density Prob[n =ñ] = xñe −x / (ñ!). The effective queue of applications isx = θx where
is the share of productive applicants in the search market. Given a worker applies for a firm, where he turns out to be productive, his employment probability from this firm is derived as follows. Suppose thatñ other productive workers also apply for it, which happens with probability xñe −x / (ñ!). Then the worker is hired with probability 1/(ñ + 1). η is the sum of this probability over allñ = 0, 1, 2, ... as follows:
To see how it works, consider the case i = 2 where two other applicants are at the firm, which occurs with probability
(the third term in the above expression). If both of these applicants appear to be suitable at this firm, which happens with probability θ 2 , then the given applicant will receive an offer with probability 1 3 . If one of them is suitable but the other of them is not, which occurs in 2 ways and with probability θ(1 − θ), then the given applicant will be offered with probability 1 2 . If none of the other applicants happen to be suitable, which happens with probability (1 − θ) 2 , then the given applicant will be offered with probability one. By induction, the same logic applies to general case with i other applicants (with probability
if j ≤ i of the other applicants turn out to be suitable, which comes in i! j!(i−j)! ways and occurs with probability θ j (1 − θ) i−j , then the given applicant will be offered with probability 1 i−j+1 . Note that we can simplify the terms,
Using this simplification, we have
Setting h ≡ i + 1, it is further simplified to
withx ≡ θx. The standard properties stated in Lemma are immediate from this expression. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting out w using equation (2), the objective function of a firm, denoted by Π s (x ), can be written as,
wherex =x(w |U c ) satisfies equation (2) . The first-order condition is,
The second order condition can be easily verified. By rearranging this condition using equation (2) one can obtain,
In a directed search equilibrium, workers must be indifferent between any of the individual firms. This leads to,
Hence, given that w a = 0, the equilibrium wage in the search market w > 0 is given by equation (9) . We now prove w a = 0 in the PEA, given the search market w > 0. Any w a ∈ (0, w) is not profitable so consider a deviation w a ≥ w. Then the deviating firm can hire an assigned productive worker (if any), irrespective of whether the worker gets another offer in search markets. Hence, the best deviation w a = w yields the profit,
Substituting c c = U c and c u = U u using (2) and w = w, we have Π a (x) > Π a ⇐⇒
which holds true for anyx ∈ (0, ∞). Thus, w a = 0 is the unique equilibrium wage in the PEA. This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Applying the equilibrium wages in the private market, w, in (9) and the employment probability η(x) derived in Lemma 1 to (4), we get the equilibrium profit of firms searching in the private market,
Define Γ ≡ Π s (x) − Π a (x) forx ∈ [0, ∞), where by (1) and (10),x =x(ρ) is determined by
This expression shows thatx(ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ ∈ [0, 1) and satisfiesx(0) ≡x ∈ (0, ∞) and
In what follows, we use the implicit equation Γ = 0 to show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium ρ ∈ [0, 1). There are two possible cases. Suppose in equilibrium a > vρ. This implies ρ ∈ [0,ρ) whereρ ≡ min{ a v , 1}. Then, using (5) and (11), we can write Γ = Γ(x) where
Observe that:
In the above, we use
is unique (that is, Γ(x) curve cannot cross the line Γ(x) = 0 more than once).
Finally, notice that thex * ∈ (0, ∞) satisfying Γ(x * ) = 0 determined above does not depend on v, whereasx (≡x(0)) determined by (12) is strictly decreasing in v. Hence, we havẽ
On the other hand, denote byx the solution ofx =x(ρ) to (12) 
which implies
To sum up, we have shown that there exists a unique ρ ∈ (0,ρ) that satisfies (12) 
wherex =x(ρ) is determined by (12) as before. Observe that:
where (12)), and
which follows from exactly the same procedure as developed above to show
|x =x * > 0 in (13) . Therefore, ρ * ∈ [ρ, 1) that satisfies Γ(ρ * ,x(ρ * )) = 0 is unique given v ≥ v * + a. 
A.4 Proof of Corollary 1
The inequality follows immediately by applying c c = e −x and c u = δe −x . This completes the proof of Corollary 1.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2 and 3
In text.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
As shown in the proof of Proposition 1, the PEA is active for all a ∈ (0, 1] if and only if v > v * . Hence, it is sufficiently to prove here that the critical value,
is strictly decreasing in m, δ, which is boiled down to prove thatx * is strictly increasing in m, δ when a > ρv. Hence, we concentrate on proving this property below, since the result on parameter a is immediate since a higher a extends the parameter space of the existence of equilibrium with an active PEA, irrespective of the value of v * . When a > ρv, with Γ = Γ(x * ) = 0 in (13), we have
In what follows, we show that Υ(m) < 0 for all m ∈ (0, 1). Now, let y(x) ≡ 1 − e −x − xe −x . Then, observe that
x for all x ∈ (0, ∞). This implies that
Since Γ(x * ) = 0, the latter inequality further implies that
The equilibrium outcome is identical to the previous one when f → 0. This profit is now compared to the equilibrium profit in the PEA,
where we now have c c = U c = e −x − f θ and c u = U u = δ(e −x − f θ ). Consider the case a > ρv. Now the fixed point condition, Γ ≡ Π s (x) − Π a (x) = 0, is modified to
Hence, since Γ(x) is continuous inx ∈ [0, ∞), there exists anx * ∈ (0, ∞) that satisfies Γ(x * ) = 0 for f <f . Hence, we have a continuous functionx =x(f ). Applying this function to (15) shows that there exists a subset of f ∈ (0,f ) that guarantees thatx ∈ (0, ∞) and ρ ∈ (0, 1). A similar steps apply to the other case a ≤ ρv. This completes the proof of the first claim in Proposition.
We now show the second claim. Consider high enough values of interview costs f ≥ m + (1 − m)δ that induces Π a (x) ≤ 0 for anyx ∈ (0, ∞). Then, since
Hence, there exist values of f ≥ m + (1 − m)δ that lead to Π s (x) > 0 but Π a (x) ≤ 0, which further leads to ρ = 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
Given the equilibrium value ρ ∈ (0, 1) (or ρ = 0) determined by Π s (x) = Π a (x) (or Π s (x) > Π a (x)) withx =x(ρ), the free entry condition
determines a unique value of v ∈ (0, ∞) (via the determination ofx ∈ (0, ∞) and (12)). Given Proposition 1, this establishes the existence of free entry equilibrium with active search markets. This also implies that there exit high enough values of K ≥ Π a (x) for anyx ∈ (0, ∞) such that Π s (x) = K and ρ = 0. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the case (6) holds true and the profit of using the PEA is given by (7) . Then, for
. Consider next the case (6) does not hold true. Then, the profit to be registered in the PEA is modified to: 
x , wherex =x(ρ) is determined by (12) as before. Observe that: 
A.10 Correlated worker types
We can modify the baseline setup to allow for a correlation between ex ante worker type (normal or difficult) and search costs. Suppose for instance that search costs of difficult types are distributed uniformly between c > 0 and 1 + c. The search-costs distribution of normal types remains the same as before. Then, with the introduction of c > 0, the effective queue of workers is modified tõ 
